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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, by and through its 
ROAD COMMISSION, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
UTAH SAND and GRAVEL PRODUCTS 
CORPORATION, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11341 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
Condemnation giving rise to damages for the 
taking of .92 acres for highway purposes, and claim-
ed severance damages allegedly caused by chang-
ing the route of the access. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The jury awarded just compensation on the evi-
dence for the property actually taken and no sever-
ance damages to the remaining property due to the 
change of access. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks a retrial to obtain additional 
severance damages. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Summons was served upon the defendant in 
this action on March 1, 1965, but the defendant did 
not request a change in the widened road's merid-
ian strip or access line until one year later (T. 37), 
notwith standing the fact that the defendant's Vice 
President, Mr. Knowlton, had been a State Highway 
Engineer and knew or must have known in 1959 that 
there would be an interchange with the state High-
way U.S. 89 with its necessary safety features (T. 
144), T - 61). 
The trial court ruled that the limited access line 
was an obviously necessary and reasonable safety 
feature, well within the discretion of1 the highway 
department and as such was lawfully and legally 
taken (T. 31, T. 46}. The testlmony also showed that 
there was still remaining suitable access from 7 400 
South Street (T. 75, T. 99, T. 100). 
··The-testimony· showed that an inflated before 
commercial value of the frontage land remaining 
was almost solely caused by the planned highway 
project and that if the highway system had not been 
so projected there would be no damages at all (T. 
95, T. 101). The defendant's own testimony was that 
· there would· be no- severance damages if the pro-
perties before value had not been enhanced by the 
proposed project (T, 114). This enhanced value was 
still somewhat remote and speculative as the land 
. jn que.stion.wa,s sJHl zoned for gravel purposes and 
not for future commercial puq:_>q~~s (T. 64). 
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Mr. Kay, called by the Appellant, testified that 
on May 29, 1959, the State Road Commission held ·a 
public meeting and that the location of the on-off 
ramps at the interchange were known and discuss-
ed (T. 144, 145), and that approximately three (3) 
weeks later the on-off ramps location became official 
(T. 166). Mr. Kay's further testimony showed the facts 
to be that the establishment of a non-access line just 
off the ramps of the Interstate I-80 was consistent 
policy decision necessary for I-80 to work effective-
ly and according to plan (T. 173). Both projects were 
so closely ir..terwoven that they are, in fact, the very 
same project, (T. 168). 
Since the facts obviously showed that the limit-
ed access line and any possible accompanying sev-
erance damages would only be caused by the en-
hancement in value of the remaining land due to 
the same condemning project, the court below, pro-
perly and in its discretion, excluded any testimony 
as to enhanced value on benefit caused by the con-
demning project itself (T. 90, 177). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID DETERMINE A NECES-
SITY OF THE LIMITED ACCESS, AND IF NOT, SUCH 
DETERMINATION IS WITHIN THE EXCLUSIVE JUR-
DICTION OF THE HIGHWAY AUTHORITIES. 
The defendant at no time presented any evi-
dence that the establishment of a limited-access line 
as per the project plans was not a necessary safety 
feature in accord with the Highway Commission's 
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reasonable policies. In fact, Mr. Kay, the Highway 
Engineer, testified that it is their policy to attempt to 
control access for a distance away from the inter-
section of the ramps of the interstate highway to pre-
serve the integrity and capacity and safety features 
of this particular highway (T. 173). It is clear that the 
purpose of the non-access line is to protect cars mov-
ing off highway U.S. 80 from those moving along 
U.S. 89, and vice versa (T. 155). 
It is obvious from the record that the trial judge 
felt that the Highway Commission acted as "reason-
able human beings" (T. 31), and therefore, "ruled 
that they are entitled to take what is known as a lim-
ited access line" (T. 46, 237). It is respectfully sub-
mitted that such a ruling is in fact a determination 
that such safety features were obviously necessary 
in accordance with the facts, a_nd Utah Code Annot-
ated, 1953, as amended, Sections 78-34-4 (2) and 78-
34-8 (1) was fully complied with. 
If such a ruling were held not to be a determin-
na tion that the non-access line was a necessary tak-
ing to such use of the highway system, it is submitt-
ed that U.C.A., 27-9-2 gives authority to the highway 
authorities to establish limited-access facilities when-
ever they are of the "opinion" that present or future 
traffic conditions justify it. Also, U.C.A., 27-9-3 says 
"its determination of such desigh shall be final." 
Since the determination of the Highway Commission 
is final, and the court determined such a determina-
tion was necessa1y, the appelant has received more 
consideration than it's entitled to. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT CORRECTLY USED ITS DISCRET-
ION IN NOT PERMITTING THE JURY TO CONSIDER 
EVIDENCE AS TO THE ENHANCEMENT IN USE 
AND VALUE OF THE DEFENDANT'S PROPERTY 
CAUSED BY THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE HIGH-
WAY PROJECT ITSELF. 
It is submitted that the defendant condemnee 
not be permitted to collect the enhancement of 
value to his property claimed as a severance dam-
age to the remaining property as this enhancement 
in value was caused by the very project that necess-
itated the change in access. If such a thing were al-
lowed to take place in the state of Utah, it would 
mean that funding, proposing and planning of all 
future projects would have to be done in secret, else 
the land-owners that were served with process later 
would gain an unjust enrichment due to mere spec-
ulation of the proposed improvement itself. Such an 
unjust result would not only cause horror to the com-
mon taxpayer, difficulties in administrative and engi-
neering decisions, speculation in land values and 
appraising, but also require the service of all sum-
monses for the entire statewide highway project at 
a simultaneous time. 
Besides the evils mentioned here, it would seem 
that to grant the defendant what is asked for would 
be unconstitutional as the resulting damages would 
not be just compensation. Such an injust enrichment 
would seem to be unjust to both sides in the long 
run. 
In detrmining the just compensation required 
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by the Firth Amendment to be paid to the owner of 
property taken for a public use, no increment of 
value arising by virtue of the fact that a particular 
tract of land is clearly or probably within the project 
involving the taking may be added. United States v 
Cors, 337 US 325. 93 Led 1392. 69 S Ct 1086. 
Article 1, Section 22 of the Utah Constitution 
does not require compensation for damages not rec-
ognized as actionable at common law, but only for 
damaging of property to an actionable degree. State 
v. Fourth Judicial District, 94 U. 384, 78 P. 2d 502. 
Merely because the highway project was planned 
before summonses were served, the property owner 
should not be allowed to collect a windfall of sever-
ance damages that would not be compensable at 
common law. The case law and common sense dic-
tate the correct policy of not allowing the defendant 
in this case to submit prejudiced evidence to a jury 
on enhancement in the value of his land by the very 
projct for which it is taken. 
27 American Jurisprudence 2d Section 282 page 
71 says. 
. . . . "Therefore, as a general thing, the enhanced 
value due to the use for which the land was approp-
riated will not be included in the measure of comp-
ensation therefor." 
27 American Jurisprudence 2d Section 283, page 
79 says: 
"In anticipation of the construction of a public im-
provement, the value of lands in the vicinity of the 
proposed improvement frequently rises before the 
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actual taking is effected by condemnation. As a gen-
eral thing, under the greatly prevailing view, the 
owner of land taken in eminent domain is not en-
titled to recover an increase or enhancement in the 
value of his land due to the proposed improvement, 
although there is authority to the contrary. In many 
cases the right to enhancement has been denied 
without any attempt to bring out the fact that, or 
to draw a distinction on the basis of whether, at 
the time of the enhancement sought to be recovered, 
it was practically certain that the land in question 
would be taken for the project. 
Many courts hold that if it is known from the 
beginning what the site of the new public work is to 
be, the owner is not entitled to claim the benefit of 
the general rise in values, since his land could never 
have been expected to enjoy the proximity of the 
improvement. An enhancement in value which is 
merely in prospect and has not yet materialized at 
the date of the condemnation clearly cannot be re-
covered. Moreover, enhancement subsequent to a 
determination of the location of the improvement, 
and after it has become practically certain that the 
land in question will be embraced by the p:-..:ject, 
is not, according to many cases, an element of the 
owner's compensation for the land taken. In giving 
effect to this rule, evidence of the enhanced market 
value of lands adjoining the improvement, but not 
included therein, has been excluded on the issue of 
the market value of the lands actually taken. (em-
phasis added) 
It has been stated that if lands are within the 
area where they are likely to be taken for a public 
purpose, but might not be, the owners are not en-
titled, if they are ultimately taken, to an increment 
in value calculated on the theory that if they had not 
been taken they would have been more valuable 
because of their proximity to the land taken. Cole v. 
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Boston Edison Co. 338 Mass 661. 157 NE2d 209, (1957). 
The Appellant cites Nichols on Eminent Domain 
and Orgel on Valuation as stating the same law as 
to enhancement by the same planning project that 
caused the taking. 147 American Law Reports p. 68 
is quoted here to point out that the just result reach-
ed in each case should be more important to the 
court than technicalities such as project number-
ing, naning and funding. 
"Without at this point attempting to explain or re-
concile the conflicting results reached in the num-
erous cases considering the question, it may be stat-
ed that the great weight of authority, as shown by 
the results actually reached in the following cases, 
denies to the owner the right to recover an incre-
ment or enhancement, due to the proposed improve-
ment, in the value of the land taken." (emphasis 
theirs) 
The basic contention of the defendant land-
owner for a new trial is that the court should not 
have ruled that the program of development at the 
intersection of U.S. Interstate 80 and Highway 89 are 
one and the same development. The court consider-
ed this at great length and concluded that he could 
not in good conscience change his ruling to allow 
such results. It was clear to him that the facts show-
ed that there was no intersection, traffic, or ramps, in 
the area before the announcement and construction 
of highway 80. It was clear to him that the limited 
access line for the main purpose of protecting the 
cars using highway 80 and that it wouldn't have 
been necessary but for the construction and use of 
I-80. It was logical to him that the alleged change 
from d gravel use to commercial was caused by the 
same highway project. Any other reading of the facts 
would dictate an unjust result. 
The drawing introduced in evidence at the time 
of the trial and made for the original public hearing 
on proposed location of I-80 indicated that the inter-
change with its accompanying ramps and limited-
access lines for safely merging traffic, were meant 
to service I-80 even more than U.S. 89. Common 
sense dictates a finding that the ordinary safety de-
sign features used on all such intersections would 
be part of this project. The Appellant's own witness, 
Mr. Knowlton, who was a state engineer at one time, 
admitted that the "project engineers' proposed 
plans" in existence disignated a necessary limited 
access (T-56). He also said that the company knew 
that there would be a complex interchange there 
as a result of I-80 (T-61). The artist's drawing of the 
plan for I-80 showed non-access fence poles as a 
necessary part of the interchange to be constructed, 
as testified to by Mr. Solomon (T. 93). 
Mr. Kay, the state engineer, stated that the two 
highways must necessarily be part of the same pri-
mary system (T. 147), and that any upgrading of U.S. 
89 was due to the interstate funding and the pract-
ical need for highway connections (T. 151). All roads 
need upgrading and repair but the change in use 
here and the limited access were both caused by the 
overall project known as Interstate Highway 80 and 
its systems. Mr. Kay said, and it is logical to assume, 
that Congress knew that all systems would have to 
be integrated (T. 158), and that it naturally followed 
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that the results would be that it would be used for 
both interstate and local traffic (T. 159, T. 176). They 
were just labeled different projects (T. 160), but the 
two systems had to be "interwoven" as to planning 
and department attitude and recommendations. Mr. 
Kay also said, 
"The interstate problem comes into this as far as 
access at this particular location is concerned, be-
cause we attempted to control access for a distance 
away from the intersection of the ramps to again 
preserve the integrity and capacity and safety feat-
ures of this particular highway." (T. 173) 
which all shows that the facts and common sense 
dictate that the trial court properly ruled in its dis-
cretion that reasonable minds could not differ as to 
find that the limited-access line was a necessary part 
of the same project (T. 90, 177). 
As to the change in the highest and best use, 
there can be no argument that if there was an al-
leged immediate change it would be caused solely 
by the announcement of the new highway system. 
Mr. Knowlton said that the value would be com-
mercial chiefly because of I-80 (T. 36), and that the 
"main event" causing a change in company position 
toward the use of this land was the interstate system 
(T. 60, 61). 
All of Mr. Solomon's before values about en-
hanced commercial property would have been im-
properly admitted as the resulting opinion on mar-
ket value would be caused strictly by the projects 
proposal and construction (T. 80). He stated that his 
comparable values were all as a result of being the 
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first service area off the interchange (T. 86, 95, 101). 
Mr. Barlow, the Appellant's other expert apprai-
ser, also stated that the enhancement and subse-
quent change in use was due to the off ramps of 
I-80 (T. 106). It should also be noted at this point 
that any comparable sales of land sold at an inflated 
value caused by the project would not have been 
legally admissable as they were not comparable 
anyway. In fact the admission of such sales might 
have ben prejudicial to the State. See 27 Am Jur. 283 
previously cited, also Cole v. Boston Edison Co. pre-
viously cited. It is also logical to assume that no in-
formed buyer would pay top commercial price for 
property that reasonably and according to the high-
way plans would have a limited access. So the high-
est and best use for the land after the project was 
not an enhanced commercial value as claimed, but 
for gravel purposes as zoned, and as properly found 
by the jury. 
The authorities that the Appelant cites for its 
contention that it is entitled to an enhanced value 
do not apply in this case. They would only 
possibly apply in the case where the project is 
definitely planned and then later enlarged by 
another separate project. Such are not the facts in 
this case. Here there is one project causing the en-
hancement and the taking. 
The Appellant would have us believe that the 
three Utah cases stand for the proposition that the 
trial court should admit all evidence, whether pre-
judicial, relevant, or on enhanced non-compensable 
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damages. The cases do not stand for the proposition 
that evidence of non-compensable damages should 
be admitted. The case of Weber Basin Water Con-
servancy District v. Ward. et al .. 10 U. 2d 29, 347 P. 
(2d) 862 (1959) and subsequent cases really hold that 
evidence as to further plans for the land condemned 
must be reasonably potential and not too remote. 
The abcve case is distinguishable in that there 
were two separate and distinct projects that enhanc-
ed and took the defendant's land. One separate pro-
ject was the enlargement of a resevoir and then the 
other, the re-routing of the highway later caused the 
taking of 5.6 acres. The two were obviously separ-
ate projects. 
U.C.A. 78-34-10 (4) says damages should be as-
sessed on: 
. . . "how much the portion not sought to be con-
demned, and each estate or interest therein will be 
benefited, if at all. by the construction of the im-
provement proposed by the plaintiff." 
The obvious intent of the Utah Legislature was 
to allow an offset for benefits and enhancements 
conferred on the remaining land by the same pro-
ject. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY USED ITS DIS-
CRETION IN GIVING INSTRUCTION NUMBER 5 AND 
EXCLUDING EXCLUSIVE EVIDENCE AS TO NON-
COMPENSABLE DAMAGES. 
In State of Utah by and through its Road Com· 
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mission v. Jacobs, 16 Utah 2d 167, 397 P (2d) 463 
( 1964) this court said: 
... "However, the projected use, affecting value, 
must be not only possible, but reasonably probable. 
It must not be merely in the realm of speculation 
because the land is adaptable to a particular use 
in the remote and uncertain future. In any event, 
the admission (and I would assume rejection) of 
such evidence is within the sound discretion of the 
trial court, which was not abused in .this case." (em-
phasis added). 
It is submitted that the trial court in the instant 
case did not abuse its discretion either. 
Not only was such evidence inadmissable as 
pertaining to an enhancement in value caused by 
the very project causing the damages as per point 
II of this brief, but also a consequential damage 
caused by an impairment of access which is not a 
compensable damage, especially where reasonable 
access still remains as testified to in the trial court 
(T. 75, 99. 100). 
If the sovereign exercises its police power reas-
onably and for the good of all the people when con-
structing highways, consequential damages for em-
pairment of ingress to and egress from property are 
not compensable. Springville Banking Co. v. Burton. 
10 U. 2d 100, 349 P. 2d 157 (1960). 
Absent an established easement, all that the 
abutting owner is entitled to is some reasonable 
means of access to the highway. Utah Road Commis-
sion v. Hansen, 14 U. 2d 305, 383 P. 2d 917 (1963). As 
pointed out earlier, there remained the same reas-
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onable access (T. 75, 99, 100) as was used 30 or ·40 
times previously to qet on the land merely to check 
it in the pr.ior 24 years (T. 54). Or in other words, the 
access rema1ned reasonably the same, hence no 
severance damages. 
The trial court _did not abuse its discretion in . -
giving instruction Number 5 which in effect exclud-
ed legally fnadmissable evidence or non-compen-
sable enhancement and damages. Instruction Num-
ber 5 is clea.rly given and effectively does what it 
was meant to do, admit proper evidence. There was 
not a knife thrust into the defendant's case so how 
could this instruction twist a knife that is not there 
in the first place. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT PROPERLY DENIED DEFENDANT'S 
MOTION FOR MfSTRIAL. 
A cursory reading of the trial transcript shows 
tha.t the court properly and as simply as possible 
explain~d ihe law as it should be applied in this case 
as outlined in Point II herein, especially in light of 
the facts then known. The trial court merely explain-
E?d to the jury why he did what he did, and in no 
way prejudiced a: ·proper presentation of admissable 
evidence by the appellant. 
POINT V 
THE COURT PROPERLY INSTRUCTED THE 
JURY AS TO THE LAW APPLICABLE IN THIS CASE. 
The court's given instructions taken as a whole 
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properly state the law of the State of Utah and ap-
praisal technique as to market value and just comp-
ensation. The stock instruction given on market 
value is simpler and better than the defendant's re-
quested instruction Number 3. 
The requested instruction Number 4 does not 
properly state Utah law as quoted in the Jacobs case 
above. The defendant's instruction hopes to collect 
uncompensable damages by placing undue emphas-
is on a possible remote future highest and best use. 
It would hardly be necessary to explain to the jury 
the appraisal term of "highest and best use" since 
they had sat through the testimony of four qualified 
appraisers. 
The testimony of Mr. Knowlton as to a commerc-
ial use due to ordinary increase in traffic was left 
to be weighed by the jury (T. 215) and they appar-
ently just didn't believe him as he had no compar-
able sales to substantiate his possibly biased opin-
ion (T. 217). The jury simply believed Mr. Cain who 
gave good concrete reasons why the remaining land 
had never been, before or after the taking, inflated 
commercial property (T. 222). 
CONCLUSION 
Taking this trial as a whole there was no mis-
trial of the defendant's case. The jury considered 
all of the legally admissable testimony. They were 
able to test the credibility of the witnesses, and were 
afforded a view of the property. They also received 
clear and intelligent instructions throughout the 
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trial as to the proper elements of damages. They 
properly returned a verdict of no money damages 
to the remainder compensable or otherwise as they 
were requested to do by the trial court in this case. 
There is no reversible error when the trial is taken 
as a whole. Therefore, in this case the properly im-
paneled and well-informed jury verdict should be 
affirmed by this Court. 
Respectfully submitted, 
DEAN R. MITCHELL 
Attorney for Respondent 
Suite 303 Upper Level 
243 East Fourth South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
